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Since 1987, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual has 
dominated criminal sentencing practice in the federal courts.1  
Revised regularly,2 the Manual provides base offense levels, 
aggravating and mitigating factors, and a range of sentences for a 
sentencing judge to consider.3  Because of the slow pace of the 
judicial system, defendants sometimes commit their crimes while 
one Manual is in effect, but are not sentenced until after a new 
Manual is issued.4  When the new Guidelines increase the range of 
punishments, potential ex post facto problems arise.5 
United States v. Booker famously excised the mandatory 
provisions of the statute authorizing the Guidelines, thereby 
making the Guidelines “effectively advisory.”6  Judges are still 
required to calculate the applicable Guidelines range, however, 
and will rarely be overturned if they impose a within-Guidelines 
sentence.7  The question thus arises: if the Guidelines are not 
formally mandatory, but remain the de facto basis for sentencing, 
does use of post-crime Guidelines8 violate the Ex Post Facto Clause?  
A circuit split on this issue has developed; the Seventh Circuit has 
authorized the use of post-crime Guidelines,9 while the D.C. Circuit 
held that such use can violate the ex post facto prohibition.10  
Because the Guidelines are a critical and ever-present part of 
federal criminal practice, the resolution of this issue will have wide-
ranging implications. 
 
 1. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A.1.2, A.1.5, 
introductory cmt. (2009) (stating that the first guidelines “took effect on 
November 1, 1987, and apply to all offenses committed on or after that date”); see 
also id. ch.1, pt. A.1.5, introductory cmt. (2009) (noting that the guidelines 
encompass more than ninety percent of felony and Class A misdemeanor federal 
cases).  
 2. Id. ch. 1, pt. A.4(b), introductory cmt. (2009); see id. ch. 1, pt. A.1.2 
(noting that the commission has authority to submit guideline amendments to 
Congress each year). 
 3. Id. ch. 1, pt. A.4(g), introductory cmt. (2009) (discussing the Sentencing 
Commission’s process for determining appropriate sentencing ranges). 
 4. See Christine M. Zeivel, Note and Comment, Ex-Post-Booker: Retroactive 
Application of Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 395, 397–98 (2008) 
(describing a hypothetical sentencing scenario with ex post facto implications).  
 5. Id.  
 6. 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
 7. See infra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 8. “Post-crime Guidelines,” as used in this article, means Sentencing 
Guidelines that take effect after the crime for which the defendant is being 
sentenced. 
 9. United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 795 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 10. United States v. Turner, 548 F.3d 1094, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
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This article addresses the arguments for each side, considers 
both the legal standards and empirical evidence, and ultimately 
argues that use of post-crime Guidelines does not violate the Ex Post 
Facto Clause.  Part I begins by providing a short primer on 
Guidelines sentencing and an example of the ex post facto 
problem.11  Part II considers ex post facto jurisprudence, particularly 
as developed in cases analyzing and measuring the use (or non-use) 
of discretion.  Part III then examines the intersection of the 
Guidelines and ex post facto jurisprudence, outlining the facts and 
holdings of the relatively few cases that have considered this issue.  
Finally, using recent data demonstrating how the Guidelines are 
applied in practice, Part IV argues that the use of post-crime 
Guidelines does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because it does 
not significantly increase the likelihood of a harsher sentence, 
either as a legal matter or as an empirical one. 
I. GUIDELINES SENTENCING AND BOOKER 
A. Structure and History of the Sentencing Guidelines12 
The Sentencing Guidelines Manual is produced and regularly 
revised by the United States Sentencing Commission, which is 
composed of seven voting members (at least three of whom are 
federal judges) and two nonvoting ex officio members.13  The 
Sentencing Commission continually refines the Guidelines, 
increasing and (less often) decreasing base offense levels, adding 
or (less often) removing aggravating and mitigating factors, and 
creating new guidelines to reflect new criminal laws.14 
The Guidelines and their amendments are both descriptive 
and prescriptive: the Commission seeks to reflect actual sentencing 
practice, but also alters the Guidelines to comply with 
congressionally-mandated directives and new laws.15  The proposed 
 
 11. See discussion infra Part I. 
 12. It is assumed the reader is familiar with the basics of calculating sentences 
using the Guidelines.  For additional background, see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL ch. 1, pt. B (2009). 
 13. See id. ch. 1, pt. A.1.1.  
 14. See id. ch. 1, pt. 2 (describing the process by which the United States 
Sentencing Commission refines the guidelines). 
 15. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007) (“[The Guidelines are] 
the product of careful study based on extensive empirical evidence derived from 
the review of thousands of individual sentencing decisions.”); id. at 46 n.2 
(“Notably, not all of the Guidelines are tied to this empirical evidence.  For 
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amendments are released on or before the first day of May of each 
year;16 the revised Guidelines Manual then automatically goes into 
effect the first day of November, unless Congress affirmatively 
rejects it.17 
These annual changes lead to the ex post facto problem.  As an 
example, consider a defendant convicted of illegal possession of 
hydrocodone, a Schedule III controlled substance.  Under the 2008 
Guidelines, trafficking 700,000 units of hydrocodone would 
constitute a base offense level of 20;18 using the 2009 Guidelines,19 
that same offense would receive a base level of 30.20  Assuming no 
criminal history and no aggravating or mitigating factors, the 2008 
Guidelines suggest a sentence of 33 to 41 months,21 while the 2009 
Guidelines provide a suggested sentence of 97 to 121 months,22 
three times as much as the prior range. 
When developing the Guidelines system, Congress, 
“[a]lthough aware of possible ex post facto clause challenges to 
application of the guidelines in effect at the time of 
sentencing[,] . . . did not believe that the Ex Post Facto Clause would 
apply to amended sentencing guidelines.”23  The Sentencing 
Commission concurred with this belief and initially did not address 
the issue.24  Despite these expectations, every court of appeals held 
that the use of post-crime mandatory Guidelines would violate the 
Ex Post Facto Clause.25  The Supreme Court likewise held that similar 
 
example, the Sentencing Commission departed from the empirical approach 
when setting the Guidelines range for drug offenses, and chose instead to key the 
Guidelines to the statutory mandatory minimum sentences that Congress 
established for such crimes.”). 
 16. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2009) (“The Commission, at or after the 
beginning of a regular session of Congress, but not later than the first day of May, 
may promulgate under subsection (a) of this section and submit to Congress 
amendments to the guidelines . . . .”).  The Commission also has the authority to 
issue “Emergency Guidelines,” which do not necessarily comply with the standard 
schedule.  See Sentencing Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-182, 101 Stat. 1266. 
 17. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2009).  Congress has exercised this authority only 
once, to reject proposed changes to the crack cocaine sentencing scheme.  See Act 
of Oct. 30, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-38, 109 Stat. 334. 
 18. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c)(10) (2008). 
 19. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c)(5) (2009).   
 20. See id. 
 21. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (2008). 
 22. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (2009). 
 23. Id. § 1B1.11(a), cmt. background (citing S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 77–78 
(1983)). 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Zeivel, supra note 4, at 405, n.70. 
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mandatory state guidelines violated the clause.26 
Bowing to the courts’ interpretation, the Commission added 
language to the Guidelines instructing courts to “use the 
Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the defendant is 
sentenced” unless “the court determines that use of the Guidelines 
Manual in effect on the date that the defendant is sentenced would 
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution,” 
in which case “the court shall use the Guidelines Manual in effect 
on the date that the offense of conviction was committed.”27  
Because every federal court had already concluded that the 
application of the post-crime Guidelines would violate the Ex Post 
Facto Clause, district courts routinely used the time-of-crime 
Guidelines Manual. 
B. Booker Changes the Game 
The rationale for this practice—that mandatory Guidelines are 
functionally “laws” and thus subject to the Ex Post Facto Clause—was 
undercut in 2005 with the Supreme Court’s decision in United States 
v. Booker.28  The “remedial” portion of Booker famously rendered the 
Guidelines “effectively advisory” by excising the portions of the 
statute making them mandatory.29  District courts were instructed to 
consider the Guidelines as only one of the several sentencing 
factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and appellate courts were told 
to review sentencing decisions for “reasonableness.”30 
Justice Scalia, in dissent, wondered whether a reasonableness 
review would 
preserve de facto mandatory Guidelines by discouraging 
district courts from sentencing outside Guidelines 
ranges. . . . [W]ill it be a mere formality, used by busy 
appellate judges only to ensure that busy district judges 
say all the right things when they explain how they have 
exercised their newly restored discretion?31 
 
 26. See generally Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987).  Miller is discussed in 
detail infra Part II.B.   
 27. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.11(a)–(b)(1)(1992). 
 28. 543 U.S. 220, 222 (2005) (holding in part that mandatory sentencing 
guidelines violate the Sixth Amendment). 
 29. Id. at 245. 
 30. Id. at 224, 245. 
 31. Id. at 313 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia wrote that “[t]ime may 
tell” the effects of Booker’s remedial opinion, and, as argued infra Part IV.B, it has.  
Id. 
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Courts of appeal struggled to answer such questions, taking 
varying approaches to the weight to give sentences that fell within 
the Guidelines and those that were outside the recommended 
range.  The Supreme Court has thus had to revisit and clarify the 
holding in Booker in several subsequent cases. 
Rita v. United States held that appellate courts may consider a 
within-Guidelines sentence presumptively reasonable,32 because 
by the time an appeals court is considering a within-
Guidelines sentence on review, both the sentencing judge 
and the Sentencing Commission will have reached the 
same conclusion as to the proper sentence in the 
particular case.  That double determination significantly 
increases the likelihood that the sentence is a reasonable 
one.33   
Gall v. United States,34 issued just a few months after Rita,35 
emphasized that “the Guidelines are only one of the factors to 
consider when imposing sentence,”36 and that, while appellate 
courts may apply a presumption of reasonableness to within-
Guideline sentences, district courts may not.37  Gall also clarified 
that no court may presume that an outside-the-Guidelines sentence 
is unreasonable.38 
Kimbrough v. United States,39 issued the same day as Gall, 
continued the Court’s emphasis on discretion, holding that district 
courts may (at least in cocaine cases) impose sentences outside the 
Guidelines based on no more than a policy disagreement with the 
Commission.40  Two years later, Spears v. United States demonstrated 
the increasingly exasperated feeling on the Court,41 as the per 
curiam decision strongly chastised lower court interpretations of 
Kimbrough, writing that “[i]f the error of [the lower court] opinions 
 
 32. 551 U.S. 338 (2007). 
 33. Id. at 347. 
 34. 552 U.S. 38 (2007). 
 35. The Court issued Rita on June 21, 2007, and Gall on December 10, 2007. 
 36. Gall, 552 U.S. at 59. 
 37. Id. at 51. 
 38. Id. at 51. 
 39. 552 U.S. 85 (2007). 
 40. Id. at 91. 
 41. 129 S. Ct. 840, 845 (2009) (per curiam). “The dissent says that ‘Apprendi, 
Booker, Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough have given the lower courts a good deal to digest 
over a relatively short period.’  True enough—and we should therefore promptly 
remove from the menu the Eighth Circuit’s offering, a smuggled-in dish that is 
indigestible.”  Id. (internal citation omitted). 
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is, as we think, evident, they demonstrate the need to clarify at once 
the holding of Kimbrough.”42 
 
II. EX POST FACTO CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
A. History and Purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause 
Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution explicitly forbids ex post 
facto legislation, stating that “[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex post facto 
Law shall be passed.”43  This bare assertion, with no definition or 
further guidance, leaves substantial room for interpretation.  
However, “[a]lthough the text of the Ex Post Facto Clause is not self-
explanatory, its basic coverage has been well understood at least 
since 1798,”44 when Justice Chase outlined four types of ex post facto 
laws in Calder v. Bull: 
1st.  Every law that makes an action, done before the 
passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, 
criminal; and punishes such action.  2d.  Every law that 
aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when 
committed.  3d.  Every law that changes the punishment, 
and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed 
to the crime, when committed.  4th.  Every law that alters 
the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, 
testimony, than the law required at the time of the 








 42. Id. 
 43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.  Section 10 further prohibits states from 
passing ex post facto legislation, one of the few restrictions on the states in the 
Constitution.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.  The two clauses are interpreted in pari 
materia and the Supreme Court has developed the doctrine in cases arising from 
both state and federal courts.  See Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 610 (2003) 
(discussing the “Constitution’s two Ex Post Facto Clauses” in tandem) (arising out 
of state court); Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S. 469 (1833) (arising out of federal 
court). 
 44. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 515 (1995) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 45. 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798). 
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The Supreme Court continues to rely on this definition in 
modern cases,46 thereby mitigating at least some of the clause’s 
ambiguity. 
The purpose of the clause, according to the Court, is twofold.  
First, it is designed “to assure that legislative Acts give fair warning 
of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until 
explicitly changed.”47  Second, it seeks to “restrain[] arbitrary and 
potentially vindictive legislation.”48  It does not, however, protect 
“an individual’s right to less punishment,”49 and “should not be 
employed for ‘the micromanagement of an endless array of 
legislative adjustments to parole and sentencing procedures.’”50  
Moreover, as the Seventh Circuit has recognized, the clause was not 
designed to “enable criminals to calculate with precision the 
punishments that might be imposed on them,”51 for doing so would 
“be both remote from the concerns that animate the ex post facto 
clause and infeasible.”52 
The four categories established in Calder are strictly 
interpreted.  “[T]he focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on 
whether a legislative change produces some ambiguous sort of 
‘disadvantage’ . . . but on whether any such change alters the 
definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which a 
crime is punishable.”53  The Supreme Court has explicitly refused 
to accept the argument that the Ex Post Facto Clause “forbids any 
 
 46. See Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 429 (1987) (“Our understanding of 
what is meant by ex post facto largely derives from the case of Calder v.  Bull.”).; 
William P. Ferranti, Comment, Revised Sentencing Guidelines and the Ex Post Facto 
Clause, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1011, 1016 (2003) (“These categories are authoritative 
and reiterated as a matter of course in most ex post facto decisions.”). 
 47. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28–29 (1981) (citing Dobbert v. Florida, 
432 U.S. 282, 298 (1977); Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 229 (1883), overruled by 
Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 387 (1798)). 
 48. Id. at 29 (citations omitted).  See also Calder, 3 U.S. at 389 (Chase, J.).  
With very few exceptions, the advocates of [ex post facto laws in England] were 
stimulated by ambition, or personal resentment, and vindictive malice.  To prevent 
such, and similar, acts of violence and injustice, I believe, the Federal and State 
Legislatures, were prohibited from passing any bill of attainder; or any ex post 
facto law. 
 49. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 30. 
 50. Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 252 (2000) (quoting Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v. 
Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 508 (1995)). 
 51. United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 793 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing 
Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293–94 (1977); Prater v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 
802 F.2d 948, 954 (7th Cir. 1986)). 
 52. Id. at 793. 
 53. Morales, 514 U.S. at 506 n.3 (internal citation omitted). 
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legislative change that has any conceivable risk of affecting a 
prisoner’s punishment.”54  Minor changes “might create some 
speculative, attenuated risk of affecting a prisoner’s actual term of 
confinement by making it more difficult for him to make a 
persuasive case for early release, but that fact alone cannot end the 
matter for ex post facto purposes.”55  Determining the required 
quantum of change has thus been the subject of several cases 
before the courts; laws permitting discretion further complicate the 
analysis. 
B. Discretion and the Ex Post Facto Clause 
The interaction between the Ex Post Facto Clause and 
discretionary decisions has received significant attention from the 
Court.  A key case in this regard is Lindsey v. Washington,56 which 
considered the effect of a statute removing sentencing judges’ 
discretion for certain crimes.  The petitioners in Lindsey were 
convicted of grand larceny; at the time of their crime, the relevant 
sentencing statute permitted the judge to impose a sentence of 
anywhere from zero to fifteen years in prison.57  At the time of 
sentencing, however, a new law directed that “the court . . . shall fix 
the maximum term of such person’s sentence only,”58 thus 
eliminating the judge’s discretion and requiring imposition of a 
fifteen-year sentence.  The Supreme Court held that this 
elimination of discretion constituted an ex post facto violation 
because “the standard of punishment adopted by the new statute is 
more onerous than that of the old. . . .  It is plainly to the 
substantial disadvantage of petitioners . . . .”59  Thus, even though 
the judge could have sentenced petitioners to the sentence they 
ultimately received, his inability to sentence them to less time 
violated the prohibition on ex post facto legislation. 
The Court addressed more subtle limits on judicial discretion 
in Miller v. Florida,60 a case involving sentencing guidelines 
remarkably similar to the pre-Booker federal system.  The Florida 
guidelines at issue in Miller were functionally mandatory; the state 
 
 54. Id. at 508. 
 55. Id. at 508–09. 
 56. 301 U.S. 397 (1937). 
 57. Id. at 398. 
 58. Id. at 398 (quoting 1935 Wash. Sess. Laws 308) (omissions in original). 
 59. Id. at 401–02. 
 60. 482 U.S. 423 (1987). 
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rule provided that “[d]epartures from the presumptive sentence 
should be avoided unless there are clear and convincing reasons to 
warrant aggravating or mitigating the sentence.  Any sentence 
outside of the guidelines must be accompanied by a written 
statement delineating the reasons for the departure.”61  Unlike 
sentences outside the guideline range, within-guidelines sentences 
were not subject to appellate review.62 
Therefore, the Court noted, “even if the revised guidelines law 
did not ‘technically . . . increase . . . the punishment annexed to 
[petitioner’s] crime,’ . . . it foreclosed his ability to challenge the 
imposition of a sentence longer than the presumptive sentence 
under the old law.”63  Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice 
O’Connor distinguished previous parole guideline cases, noting 
that the Florida guidelines did not “simply provide flexible 
‘guideposts’ for use in the exercise of discretion: instead, they 
create a high hurdle that must be cleared before discretion can be 
exercised.”64  Thus, while judges retained discretion, the Court 
believed that they were highly unlikely to exercise it; actual practice 
overcame the formal rule. 
A few years later, in California Department of Corrections v. 
Morales,65 the Court adopted the same fact-based approach, but 
reached the opposite conclusion.  Morales considered a change to 
the rules of the California Board of Prison Terms that allowed the 
Board to delay parole rehearings for certain prisoners for up to 
three years, if the Board, in its discretion, believed that it was “not 
reasonable to expect that parole would be granted at a hearing 
during the following years.”66  The rule replaced the one in effect at 
the time of Morales’s crime, which provided for parole hearings on 
an annual basis.67  Importantly, a parole hearing did not guarantee 
release; it merely provided the Board the discretion to grant or 
 
 61. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(d)(11) (1982) (amended 1993), quoted in Miller, 482 
U.S. at 426. 
 62. FLA. STAT. § 921.001(5) (1983) (repealed 1997), quoted in Miller, 482 U.S. 
at 426.  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.001 (West 2006). 
 63. Miller, 482 U.S. at 433 (quoting Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 
(1937) (omissions and bracket in original)). 
 64. Id. at 435. 
 65. 514 U.S. 499 (1995). 
 66. Id. at 503 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041.5(b)(2) (West 1982) 
(amended 1994)).  
 67. Id. 
10
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deny parole.68  Morales argued that application of the new rule 
constituted an ex post facto violation because, by making parole 
hearings less accessible, the rule increased the length of his 
sentence.69  The Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that because “the 
state has denied Morales opportunities for parole that existed 
under prior law, [it made] the punishment for his crime greater 
than it was under the law in effect at the time his crime was 
committed.”70 
The Supreme Court reversed and held that, “[i]n light of the 
particularized findings required under the amendment and the 
broad discretion given to the Board, the narrow class of prisoners 
covered by the amendment cannot reasonably expect that their 
prospects for early release on parole would be enhanced by the 
opportunity of annual hearings.”71  The Court also noted that a 
contrary holding would mean that “any legislative change that has 
any conceivable risk of affecting a prisoner’s punishment” would be 
a violation of the clause.72  Embracing such a principle “would 
require that we invalidate any of a number of minor . . . mechanical 
changes that might produce some remote risk of impact on a 
prisoner’s expected term of confinement.”73  Because the 
California rule created “only the most speculative and attenuated 
possibility of producing the prohibited effect of increasing the 
measure of punishment,” the Court rejected Morales’s claims.74 
Morales distinguished prior cases by arguing that, “[i]n contrast 
to the laws at issue in Lindsey . . . and Miller (which had the purpose 
and effect of enhancing the range of available prison terms . . . ),” 
the Amendment only applied to “prisoners who have no reasonable 
chance of being released.”75  That is, while the Board formally 
retained discretion to grant parole, it was highly unlikely to do so. 
The unifying factor of Lindsey, Miller, and Morales is the Court’s 
view of how discretion is used in practice.  When the sentencing 
judge has no discretion to impose a lesser sentence (as in Lindsey) 
or discretion that can only be exercised by passing over a “high 
hurdle” (Miller), the Court finds an ex post facto violation.  When, 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 504. 
 70. Morales v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 16 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 71. Morales, 514 U.S. at 512. 
 72. Id. at 508. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 509. 
 75. Id. at 507. 
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alternatively, favorable (to the defendant) discretion is unlikely, 
even if formally available, no violation is present (Morales).  
Interestingly, in none of these cases did the Court consider 
empirical evidence, opting instead for its own perception of likely 
practice. 
Determining the appropriate line separating sufficient use of 
discretion from formally-available-but-unlikely-in-practice discretion 
is difficult.76  The Court’s initial decisions were obtuse on this point.  
Morales noted vaguely that the Court has “long held that the 
question of what legislative adjustments ‘will be held to be of 
sufficient moment to transgress the constitutional prohibition’ must 
be a matter of ‘degree.’”77  The appropriate standard, it indicated, 
is “whether [the new law] produces a sufficient risk of increasing 
the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes.”78  The 
meaning of “sufficient” is thus critical, though the Court explicitly 
refused to “articulate a single ‘formula’ for identifying those 
legislative changes that have a sufficient effect on substantive 
crimes or punishments to fall within the constitutional 
prohibition.”79  It did hold, however, that “speculative and 
attenuated” and other “such conjectural effects are insufficient 
under any threshold we might establish under the Ex Post Facto 
Clause.”80 
Five years after Morales, in Garner v. Jones,81 the Court provided 
greater specificity, making the standard one of “significant risk.”82  
Garner, like Morales, involved the retrospective application of a rule 
reducing the frequency of parole hearings, in this case from once 
every three years to once every eight years.83  The Court held that 
the rule change did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, even 
though the Parole Board issued statements “indicating that its 
 
 76. Cf. Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 250 (2000) (“Whether retroactive 
application of a particular change in parole law respects the prohibition on ex post 
facto legislation is often a question of particular difficulty when the discretion 
vested in a parole board is taken into account.”). 
 77. Morales, 514 U.S. at 509 (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 171 
(1925)). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. 529 U.S. 244 (2000). 
 82. Id. at 251.  Interestingly, Justice Souter’s dissent characterized the issue as 
a “‘sufficient’ or substantial” risk.  Id. at 260–61 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted).  None of the opinions explicated the import, if any, of this distinction. 
 83. Id. at 255. 
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policies were intended to increase time served in prison.”84 
To reach this result, Garner established a two-prong inquiry for 
evaluating whether a change in policy “create[s] a significant risk of 
increased punishment.”85  First, the Court conducts a formal 
analysis of the law to determine if, on its face, the law constitutes an 
impermissible ex post facto law.86  Second, the Court looks to actual 
practice and the “operation” of the law “as a matter of fact.”87  The 
burden is placed on the defendant to make this showing: “When 
the rule does not by its own terms show a significant risk, the 
respondent must demonstrate, by evidence drawn from the rule’s 
practical implementation by the agency charged with exercising 
discretion, that its retroactive application will result in a longer 
period of incarceration than under the earlier rule.”88 
In applying this second prong, unlike its previous cases, the 
Court took note of statistical data regarding the percentage of 
inmates who were likely to face increased sentences.89  Though the 
dissent warned that “[e]ighty percent were . . . at least potentially 
negatively affected by the change,”90 the Court held that the 
prisoner-respondent had not provided enough information to 
indicate that the new rule “increase[d], to a significant degree, the 
likelihood or probability of prolonging respondent’s 
incarceration.”91  Such “speculation” was insufficient to warrant ex 
post facto protection.92 
The Court also noted that “where parole is concerned 
discretion, by its very definition, is subject to changes in the 
manner in which it is informed and then exercised.”93  That is, an 
 
 84. Id. at 261 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 85. Id. at 257.  See also James R. Dillon, Doubting Demaree: The Application of 
Ex Post Facto Principles to the United States Sentencing Guidelines After United States v. 
Booker, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 1033, 1037 (2008) (“Garner applied a two-tiered inquiry 
into both the formal aspects of a legislative enactment and its empirically 
demonstrable practical effects in order to determine whether the retroactive 
application of the enactments is barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause.”). 
 86. Garner, 529 U.S. at 249–52. 
 87. Id. at 256. 
 88. Id. at 255. 
 89. See id. at 251 (“‘[A]bout 90% of all prisoners are found unsuitable for 
parole at the initial hearing, while 85% are found unsuitable at the second and 
subsequent hearings.’” (quoting Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 510–
11 (1995))). 
 90. Garner, 529 U.S. at 264 n.4 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 91. Id. at 256. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 253. 
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inmate’s expectation of any particular sentence is misplaced and, 
absent evidence of formal or practical limits on discretion, the 
inmate’s misplaced expectation does not give rise to an ex post facto 
claim.94  The existence of such formal and practical barriers to the 
exercise of discretion forms the heart of the post-crime Sentencing 
Guidelines debate. 
III. COMBINING BOOKER AND EX POST FACTO 
Both the Seventh Circuit and the D.C. Circuit, in factually 
similar cases, have considered the use of post-crime Guidelines, but 
they have reached opposite conclusions.  This Part will consider 
these two cases and note how their differing analytic focus led to 
different results. 
The Seventh Circuit, only a few months after the Supreme 
Court issued Booker, addressed the use of post-crime Guidelines.  
United States v. Demaree,95 authored by Judge Posner, considered a 
defendant convicted of wire fraud based on acts committed in 
2000; her sentencing was not held until 2004.96  The 2000 
Guidelines range was 18 to 24 months; under the 2004 version it 
was 27 to 33 months.97  The district judge imposed a sentence of 30 
months, but noted that if he had used the 2000 Guidelines, he 
would have sentenced her to only 27 months, a 10% decrease 
(though still above the range given in the 2000 Guidelines).98  
Demaree appealed and the Government confessed error.99  Despite 
this, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence.100 
The Demaree court’s reasoning rested primarily on 
interpretation of Supreme Court precedent, tying Booker together 
with the Court’s rulings on the Ex Post Facto Clause.101  Demaree did 
not formally adopt the two-prong approach of Garner, though it did 
consider both the legal and practical limits on the sentencing 
judge’s discretion.102  On the practical level, the court argued that a 
 
 94. Id. at 259.  
 95. 459 F.3d 791 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 96. Id. at 792. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 792–93. 
 99. Id. at 793. 
 100. Id. at 795. 
 101. Id. at 793.  The Court did not focus on additional problems created by the 
retroactive application of Booker; this article will likewise consider only the 
retroactive effects of the Guidelines.  Id. at 795. 
 102. Id. at 795.  
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sentencing judge could easily bypass a rule requiring him to ignore 
the current Guidelines by simply indicating “not that he based his 
sentence on [the new Guideline] but that he took the advice 
implicit in it.  A judge is certainly entitled to take advice from the 
Sentencing Commission.”103  Because district court judges should 
not be expected to ignore the current Guidelines, formal 
application of post-crime Guidelines poses no greater risk of an 
increased sentence than application of the time-of-crime 
Guidelines.104  
Demaree also rejected the parties’ argument that because 
within-Guidelines sentences are presumptively reasonable,105 judges 
are unlikely to actually exercise their discretion and would instead 
opt to avoid reversal by remaining within the Guideline range.106  
The court rejected this practical point by turning to formal, legal 
analysis.107  “All [a judge] has to do is consider the guidelines and 
make sure that the sentence he gives is within the statutory range 
and consistent with the sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a).”108  So, while the Guidelines “nudge[]” the judge toward a 
particular sentence, “his freedom to impose a reasonable sentence 
outside the range is unfettered.”109  Accordingly, the court affirmed 
Demaree’s sentence.110 
The D.C. Circuit, in United States v. Turner,111 reached the 
opposite conclusion, largely on the basis of expectations about 
actual practice.112  Turner, like Demaree, arose in a white-collar 
context; in 2001, Peter Turner forged a document in an attempt to 
fraudulently cash in a life insurance policy.113  His sentencing range 
according to the 2001 Guidelines was 21 to 27 months, but the 
district court applied the then-current 2006 Guidelines, which 
 
 103. Id.  
 104. See id.  
 105. This proposition was settled in the Seventh Circuit at the time and later 
approved by the Supreme Court in Rita.  See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 106. United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 794–95 (7th Cir. 2006).  
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 795. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id.  Somewhat oddly, the court did not address the district judge’s 
indication that he would have actually given a lighter sentence if he had used the 
time-of-crime Guidelines.  See id. 
 111. 548 F.3d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 112. Id. at 1100. 
 113. Id. at 1095. 
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provided a range of 33 to 41 months.114  The D.C. Circuit remanded 
for resentencing, holding that the use of post-crime Guidelines 
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because the Guidelines, though 
legally advisory, are de facto mandatory.115 
Specifically, Turner “conduct[ed] an ‘as applied’ constitutional 
analysis.”116  It found significant the fact that the district court 
sentenced Mr. Turner at the low end of the (seemingly) applicable 
range.117  The court concluded, on this basis alone, that had the 
judge used the time-of-crime Guidelines “it is likely that Turner’s 
sentence would have been less than 33 months.”118  This was then 
re-phrased into a “substantial risk that Turner’s sentence was more 
severe” than it otherwise might have been, “thus resulting in a 
violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.”119  With that decision, Turner 
created a “crisp and clear” circuit split.120 
IV. POST-CRIME GUIDELINES DO NOT IMPLICATE THE EX POST FACTO 
CLAUSE 
Demaree established the correct rule under both the Supreme 
Court’s Booker and ex post facto jurisprudence.  Indeed, additional 
Supreme Court cases and empirical evidence not available at the 
time of Demaree further strengthen its holding.  This section 
advances, in two subparts, the argument that the use of post-crime 
Sentencing Guidelines does not violate the ex post facto prohibition.  
Part A considers the formal prong of the Garner test, arguing that 
Booker and subsequent cases have made application of the 
Guidelines purely discretionary.  Part B addresses the second 
Garner prong, and argues that empirical evidence indicates that the 
formal discretion granted in Booker is, in fact, used by sentencing 
 
 114. Id. at 1096. 
 115. Id. at 1099–1100.  
 116. Id. at 1100. 
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. 
 119. Id.  
 120. See Douglas A. Berman, DC Circuit Produces Crisp Split on Ex Post Issues after 
Booker (Finally!!), SENT’G L. & POL’Y (Dec. 5, 2008, 11:26 AM), http://sentencing
.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2008/12/dc-circuit-produces-crisp-
split-on-ex-post-issues-after-booker-finally.html (“[T]hanks to a ruling today by the 
DC Circuit in United States v. Turner, this fascinating issue is now the subject of a 
crisp and clear circuit split.” (citation omitted)).  Other appellate courts have 
addressed this issue in dicta, but none have addressed the issue head-on as in 
Demaree and Turner. 
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courts. 
A. Formal Analysis Demonstrates Discretion 
The legal landscape of the Guidelines post-Booker has become 
increasingly clear, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
emphasized the discretionary nature of the Guidelines in 
increasingly strong terms.  Booker called the Guidelines “effectively 
advisory”121; Gall affirmed that non-Guidelines sentences were not 
presumptively unreasonable122; Kimbrough held that sentencing 
courts could vary from the Guidelines based on policy 
disagreements;123 and Irizarry noted that, because of the advisory 
nature of the Guidelines, “neither the Government nor the 
defendant may place the same degree of reliance on the type of 
‘expectancy’ [of a particular sentence].”124 
1. Required Consultation Does Not Make Guidelines Mandatory 
Despite the Court’s holdings and rhetoric, some argue that 
because “sentencing courts remain obligated to calculate and 
consider the appropriate guidelines range,”125 the Ex Post Facto 
Clause continues to apply.126  This approach is mistaken for several 
reasons.  First, though sentencing judges are required to calculate a 
Guidelines range, they are also required to consider several other 
sentencing factors mentioned in § 3553(a).127  The sentence should 
reflect these factors, with the Guidelines serving merely as a starting 
point for consideration.  Moreover, because district courts are not 
permitted to presume the reasonableness of within-Guidelines 
sentences, their analysis must necessarily go beyond the 
 
 121. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 222 (2005). 
 122. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). 
 123. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 91 (2007). 
 124. Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 713–14 (2008).  See also Gall, 552 
U.S. at 51. 
 125. United States v. Restrepo-Suares, 516 F. Supp. 2d 112, 118 (D.D.C. 2007) 
(quoting United States v. Ventura, 481 F.3d 821, 823 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). 
 126. See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 548 F.3d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Dillon, 
supra note 85.  This argument, though phrased in legal terminology, implies that 
the use of discretion is likely limited in practice.  In that regard, it might be better 
suited to analysis under Garner’s second prong, discussed infra part IV.B.  The 
argument is refuted here, however, because it relies on legal standards for its 
premise.  Regardless, the empirical demonstration provided infra Part IV.B 
responds to any alleged lack of actual discretion. 
 127. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
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Guidelines.128 
Second, assuming that mere consultation of the Guidelines is 
sufficient to constitute an ex post facto violation leads to absurd 
results.  As Demaree noted, such an approach “would encompass a 
change in even voluntary sentencing guidelines, for official 
guidelines even if purely advisory are bound to influence judges’ 
sentencing decisions.”129  For a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause 
to exist, a defendant must demonstrate a close nexus between the 
matter causing the risk of an increased sentence and the judge’s 
determination to increase the sentence.  Otherwise, “any regulation 
traceable to Congress that disadvantages a criminal defendant” 
would be an ex post facto law, a result that would “unmoor[] the 
constitutional prohibition . . . from both its purpose and the 
circumstances in which statutes and regulations have heretofore 
been deemed to be ex post facto laws.”130  Merely noting that judges 
are to consider the Guidelines, then, does not inexorably lead to 
the conclusion that the Guidelines increase the likelihood of a 
higher sentence in a manner that violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.131 
2. Review of Variances Does Not Make Guidelines Mandatory 
The fact that appellate courts are required to consider the 
extent of a variance from the  
Guidelines is likewise insufficient to demonstrate an ex post facto 
violation.  Though the Supreme Court has indicated that 
significant departures from the Guidelines require more significant 
justifications by the sentencing court,132 it has rejected both the use 
of “rigid mathematical formula[e]” to determine the 
reasonableness of a non-Guidelines sentence and the requirement 
that district courts must provide “extraordinary” justifications for 
 
 128. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 49–50. 
 129. United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 794 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 130. Id. 
 131. See United States v. Rodarte-Vasquez, 488 F.3d 316, 325 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(Jones, C.J., concurring) (“A logical corollary to Booker would seem to be that the 
ex post facto clause does not apply if the sentence imposed by the court need not be 
harsher under later guidelines than it would have been under the guidelines in 
effect when the offense was committed.  Post-Booker, the guidelines are 
informative, not mandatory.  A purely advisory regulation does not present an ex 
post facto problem solely because it is traceable to Congress and will possibly 
disadvantage a defendant.”). 
 132. Gall, 552 U.S. at 46–47. 
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substantial variances.133  Requiring greater justification for greater 
variances merely recognizes that appellate courts generally require 
more information to judge the reasonableness of such sentences 
and thus encourages the district courts to provide that information.  
As the Supreme Court noted in Irizarry, “there is no longer a 
limit . . . on the variances from Guidelines ranges that a District 
Court may find justified under the sentencing factors set forth in [§ 
3553(a)].”134  These decisions indicate that, at least for the formal 
prong of the Garner inquiry, the Guidelines are not so rigid as to 
significantly increase the risk of a longer sentence. 
B. Empirical Evidence Demonstrates Discretion 
The Garner Court’s second prong is based on actual practice 
rather than legal rules.  “When the rule does not by its own terms 
show a significant risk, the respondent must demonstrate, by 
evidence drawn from the rule’s practical implementation by the 
agency charged with exercising discretion, that its retroactive 
application will result in a longer period of incarceration than 
under the earlier rule.”135  Empirical data demonstrate not only that 
discretion is prevalent in the federal system, but that its use has 








 133. Id. at 47. 
 134. Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 715 (2008). 
 135. Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 255 (2000). 
 136. Dillon, supra note 85.  Dillon, who argues that the Guidelines should still 
be subject to ex post facto analysis, concedes that the post-Rita empirical evidence 
“may mitigate the likelihood that the application of the presumption of 
reasonableness to retroactively-applied Guidelines revisions will create a 
substantial risk of increased punishment,” and further notes that, at the time of 
publication, it was still “too early to tell whether the Court’s admonitions in Rita 
will cause the lower courts to show less deference to the Guidelines than has thus 
far been the case.”  Id. at 1037, 1083–84.  As discussed infra the statistics now 
available demonstrate that Rita has indeed had the effect of increasing the 
exercise of discretion.  See infra Part IV.B.1–2. 
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1. The Data Show an Increasing Rate of Non-Guidelines Sentences 
In 2006, immediately after Booker, courts sentenced 38.2% of 
defendants outside the Guidelines,137 or 13.6%, if one excludes 
government-sponsored below-range sentences (G-S B-R).138  In 
2007, the rate had risen to 39.1% (13.5% without G-S B-R).139  The 
non-Guidelines rate continued to rise in 2008, with 40.5% of 
sentences falling outside the Guidelines (14.9% without G-S B-R).140  
The most current data, reflecting sentences from October 1, 2009 
through September 30, 2010, indicate that 45.4% of sentences 
imposed were outside the Guidelines (19.7% without G-S B-R).141 
The Sentencing Commission has also compiled data reflecting 
total post-Booker and post-Gall/Kimbrough cases.  That data reflects 
that 38.6% of all post-Booker sentences have been outside the 
Guidelines, 142 and, continuing the trend noted in the above data, 
 
 137. The Sentencing Commission data is rounded to the nearest tenth of a 
percent, resulting in slight differences in totals depending on whether one 
calculates outside-the-Guidelines sentences by adding all non-Guidelines 
sentencing percentages or by subtracting within-Guidelines sentences from one 
hundred.  See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FINAL QUARTERLY DATA 
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2006 tbl.1 (2007) (providing 38.2% of outside-the-Guidelines 
sentences if adding and 38.3% if subtracting from one hundred). 
 138. Id.  Government-sponsored below-range sentence refers to “[c]ases in 
which a reason for the sentence indicated that the prosecution initiated, 
proposed, or stipulated to a sentence outside of the guideline range, either 
pursuant to a plea agreement or as part of a nonplea negotiation with the 
defendant.”  Id. at tbl.1, n.6.  A majority of these sentences are pursuant to a § 
5K1.1 Substantial Assistance Departure motion by the Government.  Id. at tbl.1.  
Because the sentencing judge is still free to set the sentence within, above, or 
below that recommended by the parties, the total number of non-Guidelines 
sentences best captures the degree of discretion exercised by judges and is the 
primary number used in the analysis here.  For a debate on the propriety of this 
approach, compare Daniel M. Levy, Note, Defending Demaree: The Ex Post Facto 
Clause’s Lack of Control over the Federal Sentencing Guidelines After Booker, 77 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2623, 2661–62 (2009) (“[G]overnment-sponsored sentences 
should not be in the data sample because it is impossible to say what the sentence 
would have been if left solely to the judge’s discretion.”) with Dillon, supra note 
85, at 1091 (focusing on government-sponsored below range sentences). 
 139. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT: 
FISCAL YEAR 2007 tbl.1 (2008). 
 140. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT: 
FISCAL YEAR 2008 tbl.1 (2009). 
 141. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, PRELIMINARY QUARTERLY DATA 
REPORT: PRELIMINARY FISCAL YEAR 2010 DATA tbl.1 (2010). 
 142. “Post-Booker means the period from the date of the United States 
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (January 12, 
2005) through December 9, 2007.”  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, POST-
KIMBROUGH/GALL DATA REPORT app. A (2008) [hereinafter POST-GALL REPORT]. 
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post-Kimbrough/Gall cases143 show an increase to 40.8%.144  
Interestingly, the D.C. Circuit, home of the Turner opinion, has the 
lowest rate of within-Guidelines sentences, with over half (52.0%) 
of post-Booker sentences falling outside the Guidelines and 62.1% of 
post-Kimbrough/Gall sentences outside the range.145  Even 
discounting government-sponsored below-range sentences,146 
nearly one in five (18.9%) post-Kimbrough/Gall sentences in the 
D.C. Circuit were outside the Guidelines.147  These statistics 
demonstrate a large and growing independence from the 
Guidelines and certainly do not indicate that the Guidelines 
present a “significant risk of increased punishment.”148 
The Third Circuit, in the parole guidelines context, 
considered whether any specific rate of compliance is necessary to 
establish a de facto mandatory system.  In Geraghty v. United States 
 
 143. “Post-Kimbrough/Gall means the period from the date of the United States 
Supreme Court decision in Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. [85] (2007) and 
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. [38] (2007) (December 10, 2007) and afterward.”  Id. 
 144. Id. at tbl.1.   
The cases in this table described as Post-Kimbrough/Gall reflect the 61,898 
cases sentenced subsequent to the date of Kimbrough v. United States and 
Gall v. United States (December 10, 2007), through September 30, 2008 
with court documentation cumulatively received, coded, and edited at 
the U.S. Sentencing Commission by February 10, 2009.  Of these, 1,581 
cases were excluded because information was missing from the submitted 
document that prevented the comparison of the sentence and the 
guideline range.  The cases in this table described as Post-Booker reflect 
the 213,704 cases sentenced after the date of United States v. Booker 
(January 12, 2005) through December 9, 2007.  Of these, 8,102 cases 
were excluded for the above reason. 
Id. at tbl.1, n.1. 
 145. Id. at tbl.1-DC.   
The cases in this table described as Post-Kimbrough/Gall reflect the 326 
cases sentenced in the D.C. Circuit subsequent to the date of Kimbrough 
v. United States and Gall v. United States (December 10, 2007), through 
September 30, 2008 with court documentation cumulatively received, 
coded, and edited at the U.S. Sentencing Commission by February 10, 
2009.  Of these, two cases were excluded because information was 
missing from the submitted documents that prevented the comparison of 
the sentence and the guideline range.  The cases in this table described 
as Post-Booker reflect the 1,379 cases sentenced in the D.C. Circuit after 
the date of United States v. Booker (January 12, 2005) through December 9, 
2007.  Of these, 15 cases were excluded for the above reason.  
Id. at tbl.1-DC, n.1.  
 146. See supra note 143. 
 147. POST-GALL REPORT, supra note 142, at tbl.1-DC.  In the Seventh Circuit, 
24.9% of nongovernment-sponsored, post-Kimbrough/Gall sentences were outside 
the guidelines.  Id. at tbl.1-7. 
 148. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 257 (2000). 
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Parole Commission, for example, the court indicated that a non-
guideline rate of 60% “might” indicate that “discretion is, in fact, 
unfettered,” while a within-guideline rate of “88% to 94%” would 
mean that “the ‘channel for discretion’ provided by the guidelines 
is in actuality an unyielding conduit.”149  In a later case, the court 
engaged in extensive statistical analysis and found that 24.6% of 
parole decisions fell outside of the parole guideline ranges.150  This, 
the court held, was “strong evidence of ‘substantial flexibility’ in 
the application of the parole guidelines.”151  As Judge 
Higginbotham’s concurrence noted, the court did not find a 
particular “degree of adherence [that] would suffice to make the 
guidelines ‘laws,’ though it is now apparent that 75.4% adherence 
is not enough.”152  Using this standard, apparently the only attempt 
at specific numerical analysis developed in the federal courts of 
appeal, the post-Booker sentencing guidelines would qualify as 
sufficiently flexible.153 
2. Within-Guidelines Sentences Do Not Indicate a Lack of Discretion 
In addition, there are broader problems with the assumption 
that the available statistics indicate the existence of a de facto 
mandatory system.  Turner argued that the high rate of within-
Guidelines sentencing indicates that Booker had only a “minor” 
effect on sentencing and that this high rate of compliance will 
continue because “[p]ractically speaking, applicable Sentencing 
Guidelines provide a starting point or ‘anchor’ for judges and are 
likely to influence the sentences judges impose.”154  Given that the 
Guidelines are designed to be somewhat reflective of actual 
 
 149. Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm’n, 579 F.2d 238, 267 (3d Cir. 
1978) (citation omitted). 
 150. United States ex rel. Forman v. McCall, 776 F.2d 1156, 1161, 1163 (3d Cir. 
1985).  This number was derived after excluding certain data.  Id. at 1163.  The 
Parole Commission asserted that “79.9% to 86.5% of the parole decisions have 
fallen within the guideline ranges” and that “the highest and lowest rates of 
compliance by a single regional office are 90.7% and 76.7%.”  Id. at 1161. 
 151. Id. at 1163. 
 152. Id. at 1165 (Higginbotham, J., concurring). 
 153. Cf. Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 465 (1981) (“[T]he 
statistical probabilities standing alone generate no constitutional protections; a 
contrary conclusion would trivialize the Constitution.”). 
 154. United States v. Turner, 548 F.3d 1094, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2008).  As noted 
above, this assumption was the extent of Turner’s analysis of the empirical Garner 
prong.  See supra note 116. 
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sentencing practice,155 within-Guidelines sentences do not 
necessarily indicate that judges are crafting sentences because of the 
Guidelines.  Indeed, a well-designed Guideline system should 
mirror the actual sentences given in most cases.  As the Court 
recognized in Rita, because the Guidelines “seek to embody the § 
3553(a) considerations, both in principle and in practice[,] . . . it is 
fair to assume that the Guidelines, insofar as practicable, reflect a 
rough approximation of sentences that might achieve § 3553(a)’s 
objectives.”156  It was precisely this congruence that led the Court to 
accept within-Guidelines sentences as reasonable, for if both the 
sentencing court and the Guidelines agree, it “significantly 
increases the likelihood that the sentence is a reasonable one.”157 
Moreover, the Turner analysis provides no bright line 
separating when the Guidelines are followed often enough to be de 
facto mandatory and when they are not.  Does a 51% rate of within-
Guidelines sentences constitute de facto reliance on the Guidelines, 
thus raising ex post facto concerns?  Does the calculus change at 
49%?  How often must these statistics be updated?  Should they be 
considered on a national basis, within a district, or judge-by-judge?  
As Judge Higginbotham noted, courts have “not yet stated what 
percentage of compliance transforms a guideline into a law.”158  If a 
bright-line test were developed, however, “the assumption seems to 
be [that] the district courts need only periodically check what the 
current figure is to see whether the Parole Commission is acting as 
a quasi-legislature.”159 
 
 155. The Commission bases much of its work on actual practice.  See Gall v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007) (“[The Guidelines are] the product of 
careful study based on extensive empirical evidence derived from the review of 
thousands of individual sentencing decisions.”).  The Commission also attempts to 
incorporate Congressional directives.  See id. at 46 n.2 (“Notably, not all of the 
Guidelines are tied to this empirical evidence.  For example, the Sentencing 
Commission departed from the empirical approach when setting the Guidelines 
range for drug offenses, and chose instead to key the Guidelines to the statutory 
mandatory minimum sentences that Congress established for such crimes.”). 
 156. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350 (2007). 
 157. Id. at 347. 
 158. United States ex rel. Forman v. McCall, 776 F.2d 1156, 1166 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(Higginbotham, J., concurring) (citing Geraghty v. U.S. Parole Comm’n (Geraghty 
I), 579 F.2d 238, 267 (3d Cir. 1978)).   
 159. Id.  The Gall Court argued, albeit in a different context, that “the 
mathematical approach assumes the existence of some ascertainable method of 
assigning percentages to various justifications. . . . The formula is a classic example 
of attempting to measure an inventory of apples by counting oranges.”  Gall, 552 
U.S. at 49.  
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Furthermore, as Demaree noted, requiring time-of-crime 
Guideline use would be futile.160  Because sentencing judges are 
free to consider factors external to the Guidelines (and indeed 
must do so),161 a judge otherwise prohibited from applying the post-
crime Guidelines “can always say not that he based his sentence on 
[post-crime Guidelines], but that he took the advice implicit in it.  
A judge is certainly entitled to take advice from the Sentencing 
Commission.”162 
The Turner court dismissed this argument in one sentence, 
asserting only that the court “reject[s] the idea that district judges 
will misrepresent the true basis for their actions.”163  This misses the 
point, however.  The argument is not that judges will lie, obfuscate, 
or hide their reasoning, but that they are permitted to consider the 
Sentencing Commission’s judgments.  If a judge believes the post-
crime Guidelines more accurately capture the culpability of the 
defendant,164 she may impose the sentence for reasons noted in the 
Guidelines, without relying on the Guideline calculation per se.  
Indeed, the First Circuit has held that “it was entirely appropriate 
for the [district] court to consider what it viewed as the 
congressional intent behind the sentencing guidelines in 
evaluating the individual characteristics of this case.”165  “Although 
the guidelines had a significant influence on the district court’s 
sentencing decision, it plainly treated them as advisory. . . .  There 
is surely no error in that.”166  The Turner court necessarily rejected 
this argument out of hand, because its holding cannot otherwise 
account for this problem. 
 
 160. United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 795 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 161. Gall, 552 U.S. at 59 (“[T]he Guidelines are only one of the factors to 
consider when imposing sentence, and § 3553(a)(3) directs the judge to consider 
sentences other than imprisonment.”). 
 162. Demaree, 459 F.3d at 795; see also United States v. Gilman, 478 F.3d 440, 
446 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[G]iven the continuing importance of the guidelines as a 
means for bringing the policy decisions of the Sentencing Commission into the 
sentencing process, the court’s measured deference to the policies behind the 
guideline recommendations for Gilman’s economic crimes was entirely 
appropriate.”). 
 163. United States v. Turner, 548 F.3d 1094, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 164. Updated Guidelines should often better address culpability than older 
editions, as they are often updated specifically to better address the nuances of 
criminal acts.  See sources cited supra notes 17 and 162. 
 165. Gilman, 478 F.3d at 448. 
 166. Id. at 446. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Despite legal and empirical arguments, the use of post-crime 
Guidelines might still strike some observers as unfair, because 
defendants could not have known that the applicable Guideline 
range at sentencing would be higher than it was when they 
committed their crime.  The nonmandatory nature of the 
Guidelines addresses this concern, however.  While a judge must 
consider the Guidelines range, including the newly heightened 
section applicable to the defendant, she is also able to consider the 
defendant’s argument regarding timing and lack of notice.  To the 
extent the judge believes imposition of the higher sentence is 
inappropriate, unwarranted, or unfair, she can impose a lighter 
sentence.167 
Moreover, because judges are only constrained by the statutory 
minima and maxima (as was true pre-Guidelines), defendants have 
no reason to expect any particular sentence within that range.  As 
Justice Scalia argued in his concurrence in Garner, “[d]iscretion to 
be compassionate or harsh is inherent in the sentencing scheme, 
and being denied compassion is one of the risks that the offender 
knowingly assumes.”168  Any variation from an expected sentence “is 
merely part of the uncertainty which [is] inherent in [a] 
discretionary . . . system, and to which [a defendant] subjected 
himself when he committed his crime.”169 
The Ex Post Facto Clause has a specific and defined role, one 
that no longer applies to the Sentencing Guidelines.  Garner 
establishes a clear two-part test that puts the onus on the defendant 
to demonstrate harm caused by a retroactive rule.  On the formal 
level, the Court has re-emphasized, in increasingly strong language, 
the advisory nature of the Guidelines.170  Empirically, the data 
demonstrate that sentencing judges have taken this language to 
 
 167. See, e.g., United States v. Larrabee, 436 F.3d 890, 893 (8th Cir. 2006) (“In 
assessing the reasonableness of Larrabee’s sentence, we also find persuasive the 
amendments to the sentencing guidelines which became effective on November 1, 
2004, subsequent to the date of Larrabee’s offense. . . .  Here we do not apply the 
amended guidelines, but reference them because they are instructive as to the 
range of reasonableness.”); see also United States v. Rodarte-Vasquez, 488 F.3d 316, 
322 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[The defendants’] success, however, may only be fleeting 
because, when resentenced under the now advisory guidelines regime, the new 
sentences can conceivably be the same as those vacated today.”). 
 168. Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 258 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 169. Id. at 259. 
 170. See supra Part IV.A. 
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heart and are treating the Guidelines in the advisory role Booker 
envisioned.171  A defendant’s sentence, therefore, is not due to the 
strictures of the Guidelines, but to his own conduct and the district 
judge’s sense of reasonableness.  Because the Guidelines merely 
inform—rather than bind—the judicial exercise of discretion, the 
use of post-crime Guidelines does not violate the Constitution’s Ex 




 171. See supra Part IV.B. 
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